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RESTRAINTS ON WORKERS’ WAGES AND MOBILITY:
NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS
Donald J. Polden*
A decade ago, the United States Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
filed an antitrust complaint against several major Silicon Valley tech
companies for their longstanding secret agreements to not “poach” or
hire-away each other’s’ employees, notably engineers and animators.
The companies quickly settled the case, but it served to focus great national attention on the prevalent use of various restraints on worker mobility and compensation by use of agreements among competitors. This
Article examines the impact on the Silicon Valley no-poach conspiracies
on workers and the growing recognition that restraints on workers can
constitute violations of federal and state antitrust laws. The Article also
describes the recent and aggressive enforcement efforts of the Antitrust
Division through strong policy statements, submissions of “letters of interest” in private party litigation involving no-poach agreements in several other industries, and its own criminal and civil antitrust enforcement. However, the Article also argues that private and government
enforcement efforts could be even stronger if, the courts established the
applicability of the rule of per se illegality, or the “quick look” approach, to many of these agreements. The Article also argues that there
needs to be great scrutiny of related restrictive agreements imposed on
many workers, such as covenants not to compete and no-hire agreements.

* Dean Emeritus and Professor Law, Santa Clara University. He expresses his appreciation to members of the Santa Clara Law Review Editorial Boards both in 2018-2019 and
2019-2020 for their work on this article and on the Law Review Symposium held on March
1, 2019, that produced this symposium issue. He also expresses his appreciation to Dayaar
Singla of NALSAR Law School in India for his very helpful research for this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, the United States Justice Department’s Antitrust Division filed an antitrust complaint against several major technology companies for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The
complaint culminated the Department’s investigation into a long-standing set of agreements between the Silicon Valley companies that began
about 2005 and continued unabated until the Justice Department filed
suit in 2010.2 The Department’s investigation showed that the informal
agreements were entered into by the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of
leading technology companies and, in those agreements, the CEOs
1. See generally Complaint, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629
(D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010) (No. 1).
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech
Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements: Settlement Preserves Competition for High Tech Employees (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee [hereinafter High-Tech Co. Press Release].
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pledged to each other that they would not “poach” employees from each
other.3 Initially forged by legendary tech and entertainment company
CEOs George Lucas and Steve Jobs, the agreements were often verbal,
although they were followed by email communications to shore up the
details of the agreements and, in some instances, to enforce compliance
with the agreements.4 The agreements were adhered to by the CEOs
(and often the heads of human resources office) and their adherence to,
and compliance with, the agreements exerted devastating effects on the
career earning power of thousands of technology engineers and animation engineers and artists.5 The simplicity of the agreements added to
their effectiveness in gaining and maintaining agreement by the CEOs
and they resulted in blunt impacts on their targets—company employees.6
When the anticompetitive agreements were discovered, and a government enforcement action was initiated against the conspiring CEOs’
companies, many in the Silicon Valley business community were perplexed as to why these business leaders would implement agreements
that had, as their only purpose, the suppression of wages and job mobility
for their own employees. Why would corporate executives, schooled as
they all are in antitrust compliance programs and government enforcement concerns, feel comfortable entering into these agreements? Why
would they believe that their companies’ best interests were antithetical
to the interests of their employees? Why would they put the interests of
profitability and shareholders return above that of their own employees?
Those questions—which, frankly, were not completely answered or addressed in either the ensuing federal government cases or the private litigation brought by injured employees—will be discussed in this article
as will the broader policy implications involved in application of the federal antitrust laws to markets for labor and employment. Importantly,
the Silicon Valley no-poach conspiracies spawned considerable reflection of the failings of the federal antitrust laws to enforce current laws
against collusive and anti-competitive activities in employment and

3. For purposes of the complaint and the subsequent consent decree final judgment, the
tech companies’ illegal conduct included agreed-to restraints “from soliciting, cold calling,
recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees” of the other conspirators. Final Judgment,
United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. 2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/final-judgment-0.
4. In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1201 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2015).
5. Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Cal. May 25,
2016).
6. Ted Johnson, Studios Hit with New Class-Action Suit over Anti-Poaching Pacts,
VARIETY (Sept. 8, 2014), https://variety.com/2014/biz/news/disney-dreamworks-aninmationlawsuit-1201300974/.
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labor markets and signaled the beginning of an era of great governmental
protection of workers from anti-competitive conduct in those markets.
In the aftermath of the private and government actions against the
tech giants and their conspiring CEOs, the country has seen an increased
focus by state and federal antitrust enforcers against anticompetitive restraints in labor and employment markets.7 This article will consider
some of the challenges to enforcement of federal antitrust laws in those
markets, including the economic problem of monopsony and the difficulty of ensuring antitrust enforcement in buyer’s markets, and then will
consider some of the normative implications of using antitrust law to
address restrictive practices in markets for employment and labor. The
central theme of the article is that the government’s enforcement of the
antitrust laws in the Silicon Valley no-poach cases has led to enforcement initiatives in markets for labor and employment and has sparked
greater academic and private enforcement efforts in those markets. This
is a positive development because enforcement of antitrust law in these
markets has been neglected and the growing national concern about limits on worker mobility, wages, and economic prosperity requires greater
attention, perhaps even by federal competition law and policy.
This article begins with a factual and historical examination of the
no-poach agreements used by tech companies in Silicon Valley. This
background section also discusses the growing use of anticompetitive
agreements in employment or labor markets by major firms and industries and begins an evaluation of the positions taken by the courts and by
government agencies (mainly the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice
Department’s Antitrust Division and state attorney generals) in response
to growing national concerns about economic conditions in labor markets. The following sections examine how government agencies and
courts in private antitrust litigation have recently been applying antitrust
laws to labor markets including applying current antitrust analysis to nopoach and other explicit restrictions on workers’ mobility. In particular,
this article uses the Justice Department Antitrust Division’s statements
of interest in several current no-poach cases as a door to looking more
broadly at antitrust analysis in labor markets. The final section argues
that labor markets have been neglected by antitrust enforcement, due in
large part to economic and conceptual difficulties in approaching competition issues in labor markets and to limitations on the ability of current
antitrust laws to address those market problems. Concluding, this article
7. See Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Presentation at the Santa Clara University Law Review Symposium: Antitrust Enforcement in Labor Markets: The Department of Justice’s Effort 7-8 (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1142111/download [hereinafter Murray, Justice’s
Efforts].
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argues that perhaps the Steve Jobs and George Lucas led conspiracies to
restrain their workers futures were cathartic to antitrust enforcers and
have fostered much greater recognition of competition problems in labor
markets and the need for special antitrust treatment in those markets.
II. THE SILICON VALLEY NO POACH AGREEMENTS AND RESTRAINTS
OF TRADE IN EMPLOYMENT
The history of Section 1 of the Sherman Act includes some of the
most audacious conspiracies among competitors to restrain trade by fixing prices or restraining competition through anticompetitive conduct
such as boycotting competitors, allocating territories, or rigging market
prices. The infamous “phase of the moon” bid-rigging conspiracy by the
four firms manufacturing electricity generating equipment set a new
standard for corporate collusion inspired by greed. It resulted in several
executives of the four major corporate defendants being convicted of
criminal violations of the Sherman Act.8 The Silicon Valley no-poach
agreement conspiracies were as effective in stifling competitive conditions as the electrical equipment conspiracy cases of the 1950s, although
none of the tech company CEOs went to prison.9 This section of the
article identifies the harms suffered by Silicon Valley workers and corporations because of the antitrust conspiracies from the Silicon Valley
no-poach agreements and then describes significant actions taken by
government antitrust enforcement agencies in the wake of the conspiracies.
A. An Overview of the Silicon Valley Agreements
In the early 2000s, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, Inc., began to resent
the effects on the company’s innovative consumer product projects
caused by employee—mainly project engineers— turnover.10 The Valley was jumping with new startup firms seeking the next great computer
or software innovation and the economic vibrancy was fueled by
8. See Myron W. Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases—Their Implications
for Government and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 101 n.8 (1961).
9. High-Tech Co. Press Release, supra note 2; Final Judgment at 4, United States v.
Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011) (prohibiting defendants enforcing any agreement not to compete for employees of another).
10. See When Rules Don’t Apply, FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF,
https://www.whenrulesdontapply.com/; Levi Sumagaysay, “When Rules Don’t Apply”: Did
Silicon Valley Tech Giants Learn from No-Poaching Antitrust Cases?, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS (May 24, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/05/24/when-rules-dont-applydid-silicon-valley-tech-giants-learn-from-no-poaching-antitrust-case/; Mark Ames, The
Techtopus: How Silicon Valley’s Most Celebrated CEOs Conspired to Drive Down 100,000
Tech Engineers’ Wages, PANDO (Jan. 23, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/01/23/the-techtopus-how-silicon-valleys-most-celebrated-ceos-conspired-to-drive-down-100000-tech-engineers-wages/.
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engineers (mainly computer and electrical) who were managing new
product design and development for the latest technology devices and
products.11 The demand for their talent catapulted salaries.12 The expanding technical needs from historically less technical industries, such
as animation and music, further enhanced the demand for project managers, research and development and other engineering talent.13 Jobs’
response to the challenges of keeping key talent within the company was
to ask other Silicon Valley technology companies’ CEOs, many of
whom served on Apple’s Board of Directors, to refrain from hiring Apple’s engineers and, in exchange, Jobs promised that Apple would not
hire their talent.14 Apparently, George Lucas of Lucasfilm suggested
these agreements to Jobs because Lucas had previously implemented
similar arrangements with respect to animator artists and engineers at
several major animation production companies.15 The alleged Silicon
Valley conspiracy involved agreements between or among companies
under the control of Steve Jobs and/or a company that shared at least one
director with Apple’s Board of Directors.16
The agreements between these tech industry firms took two forms:
(1) an anti-solicitation scheme in which the conspirators agreed not to
solicit each other’s engineer employees, mainly by refraining from “cold
calling” prospective employees at other conspirators’ companies and (2)
agreements to compensation ranges for classes of professional employees.17 The agreements between the companies lasted from 2005 to 2009
and they were all similar in their purpose to suppress the compensation
and job mobility of the technical, creative, and selected other salaried
employees.18 The initial group of Silicon Valley companies investigated
by the Department of Justice were Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple, Inc.,
Google, Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit, Inc., and Pixar.19 The group of

11. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10;
Ames, supra note 10.
12. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10;
Ames, supra note 10.
13. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10;
Ames, supra note 10.
14. See Animation Workers, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1199-1204; Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at
277, 289-92; see also Ames, supra note 10.
15. It appears from the pleadings in the In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig. cases
that “ ‘ the roots of the conspiracy reach back to the mid-1980s,’ when George Lucas, the
former Lucasfilm Chairman of the Board and CEO, sold Lucasfilm’s ‘computer division’ to
Steve Jobs, who had recently left Apple.” Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1201.
16. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
17. See Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-04; High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp.
2d at 1172-73.
18. See High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
19. Id. at 1200.

2020]

NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

585

corporate defendants later enlarged to include eBay and international
tech giants.20
Upon learning of the agreements, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (the “Department”) began an investigation in 2009 that
ultimately spawned civil antitrust actions against six companies in the
computer and animation industries.21 The defendants quickly entered
into settlement agreements.22 Each of these agreements included a consent decree and final judgment wherein defendants did not admit any
violations of law and further specified that the judgment would not have
a conclusive effect in any subsequent private actions.23 The consent decree was beneficial to the companies but it made it more difficult for the
plaintiffs, such as engineers, who were harmed by the conspiracy to
prove their case of conspiracy to suppress competition in worker salaries
and mobility.24
The Department’s civil action was followed by several private class
action law suits filed by current and former computer and animation engineers, creative animators, and other skilled employees of the defendant
companies.25 In addition, the State of California brought an action
against some of the defendants under the state antitrust and unfair competition laws and in its parens patriae relationship to the citizen-employees of those corporate defendants.26
The state and federal court lawsuits were just the beginning of the
legal problems facing the major tech firms that participated in the no20. See Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at 275-76.
21. Final Judgment at 1, 5, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2011) (suit against Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple, Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corporation; Intuit, Inc. and Pixar). See Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1200.
22. See also High-Tech Co. Press Release, supra note 2; see also Animation Workers, 87
F. Supp. 3d at 1200; Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at 275.
23. Final Judgment at 1, U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2011); Competitive Impact Statement at 15, U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv01629 (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/483431/download.
24. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act permits a final consent judgment or decree entered
in a suit brought by the U.S. Government to be used as prima facie evidence of the violation
in a subsequent suit. 15 U.S.C.§16(a) (2012). The section also states that the prima facie rules
do not apply if the consent judgement or decree was entered before testimony was taken, thus
encouraging settlement of the government’s case at an early stage. Id.
25. See generally Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1195; High-Tech Emp., 985 F.
Supp. 2d at 1167.
26. The State of California brought actions on behalf of citizens injured by anticompetitive conduct of eBay and Intuit, Inc. and ultimately entered into settlements with both companies. See generally Second Amended Complaint, State of California v. eBay, No. CV12-5874EJD-PSG (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (No. 32), http://www.agtechemploymentsettlement.com/media/227074/ca_doj_second_amended_complaint.pdf; Settlement Agreement,
State of California v. eBay, No. CV12-5874-EJD-PSG (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (No. 55-4),
http://www.agtechemploymentsettlement.com/media/227062/settlement_agreement.pdf.
Such parens patriae suits by state governments are permitted by 15 U.S.C. §15(c)(a)(1)
(2012).
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poach agreements. The government’s litigation, which was quickly settled by the companies, gave way to multiple class action lawsuits
brought by the tech and animation workers who were the victims of the
no-poach agreements.27 Current and former employees of other technology and animation companies joined the class action lawsuits claiming
they had been injured by wage suppression, artificially fixed salaries,
and suppression of job mobility that resulted in artificial constraints on
their lifetime earning potential.28
The private class action lawsuits brought on behalf of more than
64,000 engineers, animators and other adversely affected professional
employees of defendants were settled, as was the State of California
parens patriae suit brought on behalf of 31,000 Silicon Valley workers,
with millions of dollars paid by defendants.29 The sufficiency of the settlement amounts was fiercely contested by the district court, which initially refused to approve the settlement until defendants and plaintiffs
agreed to a higher settlement amount.30
The impact of the Silicon Valley no-poach agreements and the litigation that followed did not end with the consent decrees and the payment of class action settlement amounts. The Obama Administration’s
Justice Department, together with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
decided that greater enforcement of antitrust laws was necessary in markets for talent and employees; and that began with a joint Antitrust Guidance memorandum for enforcement of those laws in markets for employees.31
B. DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals
In October 2016, the FTC and U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division jointly published “Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals” (the “Antitrust Guidance”) with the stated intention of providing guidance to corporations and other entities on the
applicability of the antitrust laws to human resource and employment
27. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires eBay to End Anticompetitive “No Poach” Hiring Agreements (May 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-ebay-end-anticompetitive-no-poach-hiringagreements.
28. Id.
29. See generally High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. See generally Order Granting Motion For Final Approval of Settlement, State of California v. eBay, No. 5:12-cv-05874EJD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015) (No. 85).
30. Daniel J. McCoy & Saundra L. M. Riley, Fenwick Employment Brief, FENWICK &
WEST LLP 3 (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/EB-03-2515.pdf.
31. See generally Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. AND FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [hereinafter Antitrust Guidance].
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practices.32 Nominally, the publication of the joint statement was intended to provide guidance to human resources professionals, but it also
served as a major pronouncement of government antitrust enforcement
initiatives in markets for talent and labor and is notable for more reasons
than guidance to employers. First, it addressed some of the uncertainty
manifested by the Justice Department’s apparent hesitation to move
against the Silicon Valley no-poach agreements criminally, rather than
the civil litigation approach it took.33 According to one former DOJ lawyer involved in the no-poach civil cases, there was some uncertainty
about whether traditional antitrust doctrines were applicable in labor
markets.34 The Antitrust Guidance, however, makes it clear that the federal antitrust laws are fully applicable to all employers and for the protection of workers.35 Second, the Antitrust Guidance specifies that some
anticompetitive practices taken to stifle competition in employment markets would be prosecuted by the Department criminally and that the government may seek to invoke the per se rule in labor antitrust cases involving “naked restraints on worker wages.36 In particular, the Antitrust
Guidance states that “[g]oing forward, the Department intends to proceed criminally against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements.”37
By this time, the administration in Washington D.C. had changed
and the new leadership of the Antitrust Division and new membership
of the FTC announced that they would continue vigorous enforcement
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in markets for employment.38
32. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 1.
33. Id. at 2-4.
34. Statement of Gene Kimmelman, former Chief Counsel for Competition Policy, U.S.
Department of Justice, in WHEN RULES DON’T APPLY, https://www.whenrulesdontapply.com/ (stating that the government’s case against the tech companies was the first to apply
the antitrust laws to labor markets). However, in a subsequent statement, a leading DOJ Antitrust Division lawyer said, “[t]he historical relationship between antitrust law and labor markets is long and complicated.” Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 6. Without a doubt,
there has been a record of government enforcement of the antitrust laws in the context of labor
and employment markets. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners’ Ass’n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S.
359, 364-65 (1926) (holding that antitrust laws applies to wage-fixing conspiracies). But they
have been infrequently applied to these markets and for a variety of reasons, some of which
are discussed in a later section of the Article. See generally Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner,
Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers? (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335174.
35. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3-4.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 4. Further, the guidelines state that “[t]hese types of agreements eliminate competition in the same irredeemable way as agreements to fix product prices or allocate customer, which have traditionally been criminally investigated and prosecuted as hardcore cartel
conduct.” Id.
38. See No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate and Prosecute ‘No Poach’ and Wage Fixing Agreements, ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-
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Following these agency announcements, the Antitrust Division has used
its enforcement powers to bring cases against firms that utilize no-poach,
no-hire, and related restraints on worker mobility and pay.39 The following section describes these efforts and raises some important questions
about government enforcement policies in cases involving no-poach or
other labor-related restraints.
C. The Antitrust Division Efforts to Enforce Antitrust Guidance
Since the agencies’ Antitrust Guidance was published, the Antitrust
Division has taken an active enforcement position with respect to restraints on hiring, salary, and employment mobility.40 Since the Antitrust Division announced its effort to prosecute employment-related restraints of trade, there have been several major developments related to
its efforts to enforce the policy articulated in the Antitrust Guidance for
HR Professionals.
First, the Antitrust Division has brought civil and criminal actions
against companies imposing the restraints on their workers. The Justice
Department reiterated that it would prosecute “naked” no-poach agreements criminally for “agreements that began after the date of that announcement, or that began before but continued after that announcement.”41 For example, the government brought Section 1, Sherman Act
actions against Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Company, major firms in the railroad equipment suppliers industry, for entering into agreements not to hire or solicit each other’s employees.42
The defendants settled the cases with the government and are defending
class action lawsuits brought by employees who were the objects of the
no-poach agreements.43
2018/antitrust-division-continues-investigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wage-fixingagreements.
39. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No-Poach Approach: Division Update
Spring 2019 (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/no-poach-approach [hereinafter No-Poach Press Release].
40. See, e.g., Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also No-Poach Press
Release, supra note 39.
41. Andrew C. Finch, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-c-finch-delivers-remarks-heritage.
42. See generally Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air
Brakes Technologies Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00747 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2018) (No. 1),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1048866/download.
43. See generally Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse
Air Brakes Technologies Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00747 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (No. 19),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1084651/download. For information on the
private actions against the railway equipment conspirators, see generally In re Ry. Indus. Emp.
No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 2019 WL 2542241 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019).

2020]

NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

589

Second, the Antitrust Division has used its “Statements of Interest”
practice to intervene in private litigation involving no-poach agreements
and to influence and inform the federal district judges considering the
antitrust significance of no-poach agreements. One of the key steps that
the Department has taken in recent years since the tech industries’ nopoach conspiracies is through the amicus program, by which the Department files statements of interest in private antitrust actions in federal
courts.44 The amicus program is a priority of the new Justice Department
Antitrust Division administration as a method of signaling the Department’s enforcement priorities.45 One of the key areas of interest for the
Department has been cases where competitive conditions in markets for
talent, employment, and jobs have been allegedly harmed by conduct
that arguably violates federal antitrust laws.46 Several cases have involved private actions against parties for allegedly anticompetitive restrictions on employment through use of wage suppression agreements
(such as no-hire or no-poach agreements) and job mobility restrictions.47
The following sections briefly describe some of the recent Statements of Interest filed in federal district courts by the Antitrust Division
in cases involving no-poach agreements and are intended to explicate the
Department’s rationale in applying current antitrust law to no-poach
agreements.

44. The Department of Justice has authority to submit statements in interest pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United
States in any case pending in a federal court. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United
States at 1, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., Civil No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019).
45. Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. 29 (2018) (statement of the Hon. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). Some history on the use of amicus curiae filing in private
antitrust litigation can be found in Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 1-4.
46. See No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“[T]he Division protects labor markets
and employees by actively investigating and challenging unlawful no-poach and wage-fixing
agreements between employers. When companies agree not to hire or recruit one another’s
employees, they are agreeing not to compete for those employees’ labor. Robbing employees
of labor market competition deprives them of job opportunities, information, and the ability
to use competing offers to negotiate better terms of employment. Under the antitrust laws, the
same rules apply when employers compete for talent in labor markets as when they compete
to sell goods and services.”).
47. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke
Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019); Corrected Statement of
Interest of the United States of America, Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc, No. 2:18-cv00244-SAB (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2019); Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry.
Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No.
158).
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1. In re Railway Industry Employee No-Poach Antitrust Litigation
In In re Railway Industry Employee No-Poach Antitrust Litigation,
plaintiffs alleged that there were agreements between two direct competitors, Knorr Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation (Wabtec), and their subsidiaries to “refrain from soliciting or
hiring each other’s employees without the consent of the current employer,” which were termed “no-poach agreements.”48 The Department
intervened and filed a Statement of Interest arguing that the rule of per
se illegality should be applied by the court because of a horizontal market division arrangement. The Department argued to the District Court
that:
Courts have long held that customer- and market-allocation agreements among competitors are per se unlawful. No-poach agreements
among competing employers are a type of allocation agreement affecting a labor market. As with other allocation agreements, they are
per se unlawful unless the facts show that they are reasonably necessary to a separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration
among the employers.49

The Department’s Statement cited multiple decisions in which
courts have denied defendants’ motions to dismiss claims of per se illegal conduct holding that the challenged no-poach agreements would be
subject to the per se rule if the evidence demonstrated a “naked” price
fixing agreement.50 In all those cases, which were ultimately settled
prior to trial, the courts held that the per se rule would be applied because
the no-poach agreements should be characterized as conduct that was
presumptively illegal.51 Because those cases settled before final adjudication, it is accurate to state that the rule of per se illegality has yet to be
applied to a no-poach agreement.52
2. Seaman v. Duke University, et al.53
Plaintiff-university faculty members in Seaman v. Duke University,
et al. alleged that the medical school deans of Duke University and the
University of North Carolina conspired to suppress the wages of medical
school professors by agreeing to a “no-poach agreement” under which

48. Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No. 158).
49. Id. at 1-2.
50. Id. at 8-9.
51. Boris Bershteyn et al., DOJ Wades Deeper Into No-Poach Advocacy, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/03/doj-wades-deeper.
52. Id.
53. Seaman v. Duke Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C.).
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“they would not hire each other’s faculty in a lateral move [unless] there
is an upward move, ie [sic] a promotion.”54
The Department intervened in the private class action suit and filed
a Statement of Interest arguing that the per se rule should apply to the
alleged no-poach agreement unless Duke proved that it was reasonably
necessary to have a separate legitimate collaboration with University of
North Carolina Medical School.55 In particular, the Department’s statement of interest asserts:
Just as an agreement between competitors to allocate customers
eliminates competition for those customers, an agreement between
them to allocate employees eliminates competition for those employees. As with other types of allocation agreements, an employee that
is a victim of an allocation agreement between employers cannot
reap the benefits of competition between those employers that may
result in higher wages or better terms of employment. Furthermore,
just as allocation agreements in product markets have almost identical anticompetitive effects to price-fixing agreements, no-poach
agreement between competing employers have almost identical anticompetitive effects to wage-fixing agreements: they enable the employers to avoid competitive overages and other terms of employment offered to the affected employees.56

Therefore, the Department argued that the district court should find
the schools’ no-poach arrangements to be illegal per se.57 The court
agreed and rejected the defendant medical schools’ arguments that the
general rule of reason should be the appropriate standard of antitrust review and that their agreement between the schools was ancillary to a
valid relationship and therefore not presumptively illegal.58 However,
the court also rejected the medical schools’ arguments in their motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and accepted the Department’s argument that:
Duke also wrongly argues that the rule of reason must apply because
the “schools collaborate and support each other” and a no-poach
agreement could help prevent “free riding” on their investment in
medical faculty. This is exactly the sort of argument the ancillary
restraints doctrine is designed to address, but there are two
54. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, Seaman v. Duke Univ.,
No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 325).
55. See id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 22 (internal citation omitted). The statement also argued that the defendants do
not qualify under the Parker “state action” exception and thereby, do not have ipso facto immunity as a sovereign representative of the state. See id. at 6-13.
57. Id. at 23.
58. Order Granting the United States of America’s Unopposed Motion to Intervene, Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D.N.C. May 22, 2019) (No. 362),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1165006/download.
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deficiencies in Duke’s showing. First, for a restraint to be ancillary,
there must be a separate legitimate collaboration that it renders more
effective. Duke has not identified any specific collaboration between
it and UNCSM to which the no-poach agreement would have been
ancillary. Second, to be ancillary, a restraint must be reasonably necessary to achieve the benefits of the legitimate collaboration, but
Duke cannot show that here while denying the restraint’s existence.59

The Department also argued that the per se rule ought to apply unless Duke met its burden of providing evidence for finding that it had a
substantial, justifiable reason for its actions to impose the no-hire agreement and that reason was ancillary to some pro-competitive cooperation.60
3. Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc.
Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. involved the use of no-poach
agreements in a fast food franchise setting where it was alleged that the
no-poach provisions were imposed in franchisor-franchisee agreements
and they prohibited franchisees from employing an employee of the franchisor or another franchisee 61 The Department intervened and filed a
Statement of Interest arguing that the rule of reason, and not the per se
rule, should apply to the alleged no-poach agreement because franchisorfranchisee agreements are predominantly vertical in nature and the ancillary restraint doctrine and the rule of reason should be applied.62 The
Department also argued that these agreements do not form a hub and
spoke conspiracy and therefore the per se rule cannot apply.63 The Department also argued that the court should evaluate the no-poach agreements under the ancillary restraint doctrine but that the court should not
apply the quick-look form of analysis because the case arose in a franchise setting.64
59. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 28-29, Seaman v. Duke
Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (internal citations omitted).
60. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 5, 19, 24, Seaman v. Duke
Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 325).
61. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 3-4, Joseph Stigar
v. Dough Dough Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244 (E.D. Wash.).
62. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 11-12, Joseph
Stigar v. Dough Dough Inc., et al., No. 2:18-cv-00244 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1141731/download [hereinafter U.S. Dough
Dough Corrected Statement].
63. See id. at 16-17.
64. Quick-look analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act is an intermediary form of
analysis of restraints on competition, usually some type of restraint on price. It is used in
situations where the court believes that the price restrictive conduct has some potential ameliorating aspects and, therefore, the rule of per se illegality should not be used. However, the
court applying this analysis does not evaluate the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive

2020]

NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

593

The Department argued in the Statement that:
In the franchise context, the typical no-hire or no-solicitation agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee precludes the franchisee
from hiring or soliciting other franchisees’ employees. Such a typical restriction is a vertical allocation agreement “limiting the number
of [employers] competing for …a given group of [employees],” and
its anticompetitive effects… can be adequately policed under the rule
of reason.
Even though the typical no-poach agreement between a franchisor
and one of its franchisees is vertical, it could be horizontal if it restrains competition between two interrelated entities. Specifically, a
franchisor and one of its franchisees may actually or potentially
“compete in the market in which the relevant employees are hired.”
If operating in the same geographic market, they both could look to
the same labor pool to hire, for example, janitorial workers, accountants, or human resource professionals. In such circumstances, the
franchisor is competing with its franchisee, “notwithstanding that
they do not compete in the market in which their goods or services
are sold.” If a complaint plausibly pleads direct competition between
a franchisor and its franchisees to hire employees with similar skills,
a no-poach agreement between them is correctly characterized as
horizontal, and, if not ancillary to any legitimate procompetitive joint
venture, would be per se unlawful.65

The Department’s use of its Statement of Interest powers in these
cases help shape the courts’ decisions on important antitrust issues in
private party no-poach cases. Without question, the several Statements
of Interest in private cases have led to settlements and, more significantly, better antitrust analysis by the federal courts in those cases.66 Despite these helpful steps, conceptual and practical ambiguities remain
within the Department’s recommendations. These ambiguities leave
courts uncertain regarding the proper Section 1, Sherman Act analysis in
cases involving employment related restraints. The next section of this
article takes up the debate.
III. THE EFFICACY OF THE DEPARTMENT’S POSITIONS IN THE
effects to the same extent as performed under the rule of reason. See Edward D. Cavanagh,
What Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV 39, 55-56 (2017).
65. U.S. Dough Dough Corrected Statement, supra note 62, at 12-13 (internal citations
omitted).
66. See, e.g., Danielle Seaman v. Duke University and Duke University Health System,
ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/danielle-seaman-v-duke-university-et-al (settling approximately 6 months
after the Statement of Interest); U.S. Dough Dough Corrected Statement, supra note 62; Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No.
2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No. 158).
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STATEMENTS AND JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT’S
ARGUMENTS
This section continues the discussion of the Department’s arguments and recommendations in its Statements and, more importantly,
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of those positions. It also describes the varying reactions of the courts in which the Statements were
filed, although those private civil antitrust cases have either settled or are
continuing, as revealed by opinions on motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws.
A. The Department’s Enforcement Policy Articulated in its Statements
of Interest
The Department’s use of Statements of Interests in several nopoach agreement cases, as discussed in the previous section, as well as
public comments by Department leaders reveal that the Department advocates a traditional approach to both the characterization of the nopoach restraints (i.e., either as a “naked” restraint or as vertical restraints
that may demonstrate procompetitive attributes) and to the appropriate
forms of antitrust analysis (i.e., either the per se rule approach or as one
to be analyzed under the comprehensive rule of reason approach).67 The
Department’s position is that a horizontal agreement to fix employee
wages or not hire each other employees is a “naked” restraint of trade
and lacks redeeming pro-competitive justifications and is therefore per
se illegal.68 Further, the Department’s position is that for all other employment related restraints of trade, the appropriate form of antitrust
analysis is the more comprehensive rule of reason analysis.69 Thus, the
Department has chosen to consider no-poach agreements, in their purpose and effect, to be like other forms of restraints that have been reviewed by the courts—such as customer or market allocations—and not
as novel or a new form of commercial conduct that would require a
threshold determination under the rule of reason or quick-look analysis

67. See supra Section I.B; see, e.g., Finch, supra note 41 (“Agreements between employers that eliminate competition for employees in the form of no-poach agreements are per se
violations of the Sherman Act.”); Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3-4, 8; No-Poach Press
Release, supra note 39 (describing the Department’s prosecution of and intervention in cases
of naked no-poach agreements and its argument that such vertical restraints are subject to the
per se rule).
68. See, e.g., No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“[N]aked no-poach agreements
between rival employers within a franchise system are subject to the per se rule.”).
69. See, e.g., id. (explaining that, unlike horizontal agreements, “[a] restriction in a franchise agreement that forbids franchisees from poaching each other’s employees . . . is subject
to the rule of reason in the absence of agreement among the franchisees because it is a vertical
restraint.”).
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to determine if it is mainly and usually anticompetitive.70 That position
by the government seems sensible and appropriate but some of the courts
that received Statements did perform a threshold evaluation of no-poach
and no-hire agreement to determine what form of analysis should be applied.71 In particular, the district court in Aya Healthcare Services, Inc.
v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., in an opinion on defendant’s motion to dismiss,
performed a thoughtful characterization process on a hard-core no-poach
provision in a collaboration agreement between competitors in the market for travel nurses and associated tech personnel.72 The court’s approach is instructive for other courts evaluating Section 1 claims in cases
involving no-poach, no-hire, non-solicitation and similar agreements or
provisions within some other collaborative arrangement.73
However, the Department has indicated that it will advocate for application of the ancillary restraint doctrine in some types of no-poach
and related restraint-on-employment cases rather than the more traditional reasonableness or per se illegal forms of analysis.74 Further, the
Department has repeatedly rejected application of the “quick-look” analysis in all cases involving no-poach agreements.75 The next sections will
discuss these positions by the Department and how the courts have responded to the Statements.
70. The Department has argued that no-poach and similar employment restraints agreed
to be competitor-employers are substantially similar to customer allocation and market division agreements and has stated that the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) and Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)
reiterated that such agreements are illegal per se. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United
States of America at 20, Seaman v. Duke Univ., Civ. No. 1:15-cv-462 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7,
2019).
71. See, e.g., Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 2018 WL 3032552
(S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018); In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d
464 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
72. Aya Healthcare, 2018 WL 3032552, at *8-14 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018). The restrictive provision was imposed by defendant’s agreements with subcontractors and software-platform providers in the national market for traveling nurses and medical technicians who travel
throughout the country to perform temporary assignments in understaffed hospitals. Plaintiff
operates a competitive business and claimed to have a difficult time getting traveling nurses
because of the defendant’s no-poach provisions in contracts with traveling nurse subcontractors and had entered into no hire agreements with competitors (like the plaintiff) whose businesses were to provide nurse subcontracts. The court described the no-poach provisions to
“forbid the rival providers in perpetuity to initiate job offers or otherwise solicit any of [defendant’s] designated ‘employees,’ no matter how or where employed, and even when not
currently on assignment for [defendant].” Id. at *9.
73. The Aya Healthcare Services court’s analysis of the employment restrictions in that
case are discussed later in the article.
74. See, e.g., No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“If there is an alleged agreement
among the franchisees, the restraint is subject to the rule of reason so long as it is ancillary;
that is, separate from, and reasonably necessary to, the legitimate franchise collaboration.”).
75. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he ‘quick-look’ form of rule of reason analysis is inapplicable because the court should weigh the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive benefits
of franchise no-poach agreements that qualify as either vertical or ancillary restraints.”).
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B. Rejection of “Quick-look” Analysis
The “quick-look” form of Section 1, Sherman Act antitrust analysis
has been somewhat controversial in recent years. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has used it or rejected it in at least three decisions
and, therefore, it remains somewhat murky in terms of its appropriate
use in restraint of trade cases. Justice Souter rejected the court of appeals’ use of the quick-look approach in California Dentists, a case involving the FTC’s challenge to a dentists’ association limits on member
price discounting and advertising.76 The Court reasoned that the quicklook approach to anticompetitive conduct under Section 1 was not sensitive enough to the justifications for the dentists’ restrictions on members’ advertising.77 The majority opinion in California Dentists
acknowledged that Supreme Court cases “have formed the basis for what
has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis under the rule
of reason, an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”78 The Court also
stated that “quicklook analysis carries the day when the great likelihood
of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”79
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,80 endorsed the viability of the “quick-look” analysis in Section 1 cases: “To
be sure, we have applied the quick-look doctrine to business activities
that are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory examination before imposing antitrust liability.”81 Despite the Antitrust Division’s position that it should not be used by courts in no-poach
cases, quick-look analysis remains a recognized analytic approach to
Section 1 cases involving agreements to restrain trade. There are two
reasons that may explain why the government antitrust enforcement
agency does not advocate for quick-look analysis in agreements to restrict employee compensation and job mobility. First, it may reflect the
notion that the Department does not believe that the approach has “stay
power” and will not be more broadly adopted by the courts as a viable
analytic approach to these restraints. Second, the Department’s position
may be due to its belief that there are aspects to the no-poach agreements
that make “quick-look” inappropriate as a matter of antitrust analysis.

76. For a discussion of the application of the quick-look analysis in California Dentist
case, see Cavanagh, supra note 64, at 54. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Com’n, 526
U.S. 756, 759-64, 780-81 (1999).
77. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81.
78. Id. at 770.
79. Id.
80. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
81. Id. at 7, n.3 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.).
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On the first possible reason, it is true that quick-look analysis has
received little attention by trial courts and agencies, but several federal
circuit courts of appeal have expressly approved the appropriate use of a
quick-look approach in Section 1, Sherman cases.82 Since National Society of Professional Engineers, the Court has indicated that the traditional two-test approach—rule of reason or per se illegal—to restraints
of trade may not be flexible and robust enough to permit courts to predictably sift through the matrix of industries, allegedly anticompetitive
practices, and competitive implications of the accused practices, and that
a broader set of possible analytic approaches is needed.83 The Department’s position on prosecuting no-poach agreements strongly advocates
for the use of the per se standard for “naked” restraints on price and the
use of the rule of reason standard in all other cases involving no-poach
agreements or employment restrictive practices.84 Thus, a fundamental
issue in recommending, or not, the use of the “quick-look” analysis is
whether the restraint in question is a practice so plainly anticompetitive
that it is a good candidate for the quick-look approach.85 Alternatively,
courts can consider whether there are procompetitive attributes of nopoach and related restrictive practices on employees that a full blown
rule of reason analysis is needed to ensure that some positive and procompetitive practices are not prematurely struck down by reason of the
truncated analysis involved in the quick-look approach.
At this point, it is helpful to canvas the categories of employment
related restraints on trade (an antitrust law issue) and restraints on

82. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 275 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Under
the quick-look standard, the Plaintiffs have met their burden of raising a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Dean Foods violated the antitrust laws even without establishing
the relevant geographic market.”); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010,
1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We find it appropriate to adopt such a quick look rule of reason in
this case. Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is established,
even without a determination of the relevant market.”).
83. Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Indeed, Justice
Souter speaking for the Court in the California Dental Association case quoted Professor
Philip Areeda, the most significant antitrust scholar of modern times, to suggest both that the
courts already use a non-binary Section 1 analysis and, even then, it is potentially misleading
to suggest that great precision in weeding out clearly illegal restraints from ones that should
be permitted. 526 U.S. at 780 (quoting Philip Areeda, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1507, p. 402 (1986):
“There is always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding
scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for….”).
84. See, e.g., Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3 (“Naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements among employers, whether entered into directly or through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws. That means that if the agreement is
separate from or not reasonably necessary to a larger legitimate collaboration between the
employers, the agreement is deemed illegal without any inquiry into its competitive effects.”);
No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (opining that, in the franchise context, naked restraints
are per se unlawful while vertical restraints are subject to the rule of reason).
85. See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 7, n.3.

598

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:59

employment mobility (an employment law issue) and evaluate their potential for anti-competitive effects and any pro-competitive implications
in use of those restraints. If there are few pro-competitive, redeeming
virtues to these restraints, then the quick-look analysis might, as Justice
Souter pointed out, “carr[y] the day,” and the court, applying the rationale of Indiana Federation of Dentists, would conclude without extensive evaluation that the restraint should be struck down.86
At one end of a spectrum of practices,87 that involve restraints on
employees, are the limitations on competition after the sale of a business,
including a merger or other acquisitive transaction.88 These agreements
have long been held to be permissible as a matter of state law favoring
transactions that permit individuals to sell their businesses and are the
result of business equals—a buyer and seller—who agree to the terms of
the sale, including consideration for a forbearance by the seller from returning to the market and competing against the buyer.89
86. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770-71.
87. A treatise on employment law described this spectrum of employer-employee arrangements that involve limitations on competition by the employee:
“A federal district court, applying California law which broadly proscribes non-compete
agreements, identified five different types of contractual provisions that might implicate a
violation of the prohibiting restrictive covenants and, potentially, a violation of antitrust law:
(1) An agreement between an employer and an employee in which the employee
agrees not to work for a competitor of the employer for a certain period of time (a
classic non-compete agreement).
(2) An agreement forbidding the solicitation of the employer’s customers by the
employee for a certain period of time following termination of employment (a variation of non-compete provision).
(3) An agreement between a business and its customer that provides services of its
employees directly to a customer in which the customer agrees not to hire the business’ employees (a type of “no hire” agreement in which the agreement is between
a business and its customer but not the business’ employee).
(4) An agreement that restricts an employee or former employee from soliciting the
employer’s other employees (such as by approaching them for the purpose of encouraging the employees to leave and work for a competitor).
(5) An agreement between an employee and employer stipulating that the employee
will not merely refrain from soliciting the employer’s other employees but will not
hire those fellow employees.”
MARK BENNETT, DONALD POLDEN & HOWARD RUBIN, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS:
LAW & PRACTICE §11.03 [D][5], p. 31 (Wolters Kluwer 2019) (quoting from Thomas Weisel
Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, 2010 WL 546497 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
88. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
district court properly applied rule of reason to no-hire agreement because it was a covenant
not to compete and therefore a legitimate ancillary restraint executed upon transfer of owners
of a business by merger transaction).
89. See Philip T. von Mehren et al., The Enforceability of Non-Competition Covenants
Incident to the Sale of a Business, VENABLE LLP (May 30, 2019), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2019/05/the-enforceability-of-non-competition-covenants (explaining that “in both New York and Delaware, courts distinguish between the law governing
covenants not to compete when incident to the sale of a business, and the law governing noncompetition agreements arising solely out of employment”); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF.
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An intermediate category of restraints includes employer-imposed
non-competition agreements whereby the employee, with consideration,
paid for agreement to forego competing against his former employer.90
At English common law, which was later borrowed in American common law courts, these restrictions on subsequent employment were considered beneficial if the employee received some compensation and the
reach and scope of the restriction on competing against the former employer was reasonable in scope and duration.91 In the early days of the
Sherman Act, the courts attempted to factor in this reasonableness standard into the then new antitrust laws.92 Indeed, the reasonableness standard in Section 1, Sherman Act cases had its origin in common law cases’
emphasis on enforcement of such agreements as long as they were reasonable in scope (e.g., geographical or customer limitations).93 This intermediate list of restrictions on a former employee’s competitive posttermination activities further included non-solicitation agreements (i.e.,
agreements prohibiting active recruitment of the employer’s other employees) and non-disclosure agreements (i.e., agreements prohibiting a
former employee from disclosing the employer’s information and trade
secrets).94
At the other end of the spectrum are no-poach and no-hire agreements entered into by competitors in markets for labor. These are the
Silicon Valley agreements.95 Notwithstanding the Justice Department’s
failure to bring criminal action against the Silicon Valley companies, the
Department’s position is that these are “naked” restraints identical to
cartel price fixing agreements and they could be prosecuted criminally.96
Antitrust analysis of some forms of employment related restraints
on employees should proceed under the rule of reason where the types
of restraint (for example, covenants not to compete) have been evaluated
for reasonableness by state courts for a long time. Further, evaluation of
CODE § 16601 (West 2007) (excepting the sale of a business from California’s statute banning
non-compete agreements).
90. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consideration: A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L.
REV. 409, 423-27 (2015) (describing what constitutes sufficient consideration to forgo competition among various states).
91. Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement Law & the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 448-50 (2009).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1987); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
93. See Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L.
REV. 759, 773 (1955); Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2293-99 (2013).
94. Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which Types of Restrictive Covenants Are Enforceable, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 430 (2006).
95. See Ames, supra note 10.
96. See Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 4.
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these restraints on workers under the rule of reason is analytically sound
because there are arguably pro-competitive justifications for their use
and the per se and “quick-look” analyses would be too inflexible in considering those benefits and justifications. However, no-poach and nohire agreements between competitors have few pro-competitive justifications and the per se rule, as argued by the Department, and the “quicklook” analysis would be well suited to address these restraints on worker
wages, benefits and mobility.97
C. The Utility of the Ancillary Restraint Doctrine
The Department’s position on no-poach claims also recommends
analysis that utilizes the ancillary restraint doctrine, which essentially
justifies a restraint on trade if it is ancillary to a legitimate transaction,
even where the restraint is characterized as a per se, or naked, restraint.
Relying on Judge Bork’s decision in Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc.,98 the Department argued that:
[i]f the facts show that no-poach agreements are reasonably necessary to a separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration
among employers, they are not per se unlawful and would instead be
judged under the rule of reason. Under the ‘ancillary restraint doctrine,’ an agreement ordinarily condemned as per se unlawful is ‘exempt from the per se rule” if it is ancillary to a separate, legitimate
venture between the competitors.99

The Department Statement continues that “ ‘ [t]o be ancillary,’ an
‘agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral
to a separate, legitimate transaction,’ and reasonably necessary to ‘make
the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.’ ” 100
According to the Antitrust Division, the issue of “ancillarity”—whether
or not the restraint occurred as a part of a transaction the primary purpose
97. Some courts addressing the Department’s contentions in Statements of Interest have
reached a similar conclusion and stated that, upon completion of discovery, they may decide
to declare that the per se or quick-look analysis would be applied to those restraints. See, e.g.,
Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 481-82 (“The court’s decision that the agreements alleged by
plaintiff are plausibly per se violations of the antitrust law is supported by the case law and
the position of the DOJ, which was articulated by the government at the hearing on the motion
to dismiss.”); Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, No. 3:18-cv-00133-NJR-RJD, 2019 WL
2754864, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019) (explaining that the prior judge disagreed with the
DOJ’s Statement of Interest and held that the quick look analysis could be applied to vertical
restraints on trade for franchise agreements depending on the facts of the case); In re Papa
John’s Emp. and Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL
5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2019) (declining to announce a quick look or rule of reason
analysis without further factual development).
98. 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
99. Statement of Interest of the United States at 10, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach
Antitrust Litig., Civ. No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019).
100. Id.
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of which is procompetitive, is fundamental to the ultimate decision to
apply the per se or rule of reason, because “there are two ways for a nopoach agreement to be subject to the rule of reason and not the per se
rule: verticality and ancillarity.”101
The Department’s position is thus that no-poach provisions or covenants in franchise agreements must be reviewed under a rule of reason
analysis where the relationship between the no poach provision and the
franchise system is a vertical one and that the no poach restriction is
necessary to make the franchise system work more efficiently in making
the franchise system work.102 The verticality issue arises because of the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions rejecting the longstanding use of the
rule of per se illegality in virtually all vertical relationships and instead
requiring a full blown rule of reason analysis.103 However, in some franchise relationships, the franchisor functions in a vertical relationship to
its franchisees while also competing against them when it operates company owned stores.104 When this occurs, the restraint is horizontal and
agreements between competitors (here, franchisor and franchisees or between franchisees) are therefore presumptively illegal.105 Further, in
other situations the no-poach restraint may be imposed vertically, such
as by a franchisor who does not maintain company offices and therefore
does not compete with its franchisees in either the market for the franchise branded product or in the market for the employees who produce
the branded product. In that situation, the no-poach restriction is imposed vertically by the franchisor but is implemented for the benefit of
the franchisees who are in a horizontal relationship with each other in
the market for the franchise branded product. In these situations, either
the restraint on trade is imposed by a horizontal agreement or the intended impact of the restraint on trade is felt on a horizontal level.
The difficulty with the Department’s analysis is the horizontal implications of these no-poach agreements. Are there clear pro-

101. Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 13.
102. Id.
103. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 2, 22 (1997).
104. See Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 12; Randy M. Stutz, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel of the Am. Antitrust Inst., The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf
[hereinafter Stutz, Evolving Antitrust]; see, e.g., Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC,
No. 2:18-cv-13207-VAR-DRG, 2019 WL 2247731, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) (alleging that the defendants “orchestrated an agreement not to compete for labor among their franchisees”).
105. See, e.g., Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731, at *4-5 (finding that the plaintiff plausibly
pled an alleged anticompetitive agreement in the franchise context was sufficiently unreasonable under the per se rule and the quick-look analysis).
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competitive benefits from these horizontal restrictions on workers’ mobility, and with it the suppression of workers’ wages, or are these restraints largely devoid of competition-enhancing attributes? The Court’s
rejection of bright line rules in some vertical restraint cases has made it
clear that an overriding reason for the application of the rule of reason is
that the vertically-related parties have aligned interests in maximizing
sales through cooperation and, to some degree, a subordination of their
respective self-interests in order to achieve sales.106 However, in those
cases the restraints occur in a single market, the intra-brand market, and
not in two markets.107 In the context of franchise relationships, the franchisees and franchisor have a common interest in the franchise product
(e.g., hamburgers for fast food franchises) but that product is not fungible or interchangeable with the employees who make the burgers; the
markets for hamburgers and employees are distinct.108 A Department
official stated that “[f]rancisors and franchisees, of course, are primarily
in a vertical relationship in their industry and generally not competitors
with respect to the labor market.”109 However, the official stated that he
is aware:
[T]hat companies can be competitors in the labor market but not
competitors in product or service markets. Companies in different
industries can compete in the same market for employees. But if they
are not competitors in the labor market but instead are, for example,
vertically related in their industry, then any agreement among them
is subject to the rule of reason.110

A related concern is the Antitrust Division’s position on the ancillary restraint doctrine’s applicability to franchise system restrictions on
workers of franchisor and franchisees. The Division has recommended
that the doctrine be applied and the no-poach restraint analyzed under
the rule of reason when it is collateral to the franchise arrangement and
that it is necessary to make the franchise system work efficiently.111 The
clear purpose and effect of both no-hire and no-poach agreements—
whether in the franchise context or in the independent or unrelated competitor context—is to restrict employee mobility and compensation for
purposes of reducing the employers’ costs by paying the employees less.
While partial integration, such as by joint venture or creating a franchise
106. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877 (holding that “vertical price restraints are to be
judged by the rule of reason.”).
107. See id. at 902-04; see also Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
108. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955,
at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (examining the relationship between noncompete agreement
and pro-competitive benefits in the franchise context).
109. Murray, Justice’s Efforts, note 7, at 12.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 12.
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system, may result in cost-reduction opportunities for the firm, the reduction in employee costs by franchisor-franchisee no-poach agreements presents no benefits for the employees.
It might be helpful to look at the justifications for no-poach (and
similar) restrictions on employee mobility and wages and balance them
against the obvious anticompetitive implications of these restrictions.
No-poach agreements are an extreme form of non-compete provision in
that they both constrain or outright limit employee mobility during employment with the employer or, more often, after the employee or employer terminate the employment. It has been argued, and accepted by
some courts and legislatures, that reasonable restrictions on worker mobility are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets, confidential
commercial information that the employee gained during employment,
and to protect the employer’s investment in the employee such as, by
training.112 However, the most significant difference between a noncompete provision and no-poach and no-hire agreements is that the employee does not agree to the employer’s restriction on the employee’s
mobility and wages; it is imposed by employers’ agreement. In most
non-compete agreements between employers and employees, the employee must receive sufficient consideration for the agreement to be
valid under state contract laws; no-poach and no-hire agreements most
often involve no compensation for the employee.113 Employers have
several methods for restricting employees from wrongfully taking and
using the employers’ trade secrets with subsequent employers, including
the Uniform Trades Secrets Act, which has been adopted by nearly every
state, and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. There are also contractual methods by which employers can secure their confidential commercial information and be reimbursed for the training and other investments
they have taken in their employees that are short of outright restraints on
worker mobility.114 With the availability of these much less restrictive
measures to protect employers’ legitimate interests, antitrust challenges
to employer imposed non-compete arrangements may be successful.
The Department’s arguments that no-poach provisions in franchise
agreements should be considered vertical restraints and analyzed under
the rule of reason are similarly weakened by the absence of any
112. See Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts 5 (Sept. 13, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3453433 [hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Challenge].
113. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 90, at 424; Steven Massoni, Limits of Noncompete, No-Poaching, and No-Hire Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2018/11/29/limits-of-noncompete-no-poaching-and-no-hireagreements%EF%BB%BF/.
114. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 90, at 422-23 (describing interests of employers
and society in using non-compete agreements to protect trade secrets).
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appreciable competitive benefits from the no-poach agreements between
franchisees and the franchisor (when it also maintains stores that compete for workers with its own franchisees). There may be credible arguments as to why vertically imposed price and non-price restraints have
procompetitive benefits, but it is not possible to identify them in vertically imposed restrictions on worker mobility.115 The franchisor, in
those situations, is attempting to enhance its competitiveness on price in
the inter-brand market for its product (e.g., hamburgers) by constraining
inter-brand competition in a distinctly different market (e.g., workers
who can make burgers) and thereby enables franchisees to eliminate
competition in the market for workers. The Court in Leegin Creative
Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. considered a similar situation in the context of a minimum resale price maintenance scheme and, in a confusing
juxtaposition, said that the cartel arrangements between either a manufactures’ group or a group of competing retailers are per se illegal but
“[t]o the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is
entered up to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too would need to be held
unlawful under the rule of reason.”116 It is surprising that the Court
would relegate these forms of cartel agreements, irrespective of the
source of “facilitation,” to the rule of reason analysis when the rule of
per se illegality has been the longstanding analytic approach to agreements among competitors to restrain price competition.117 This may
very well be a highly appropriate situation for the “quick-look” rule of
reason approach to determine if there are facially valid competitive benefits to a franchisor’s efforts to eliminate worker wage competition at the
franchisee level.
A franchisor who uses no poach or no hire provisions in the franchise arrangement precludes worker wage competition in a horizontal
context (i.e., where the franchisor also competes intra-brand at the franchisee level) or in a vertical context (i.e., where the franchisor agrees
with franchisees to eliminate wage price competition at the franchisee

115. Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 71
(2019),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4919&context=lcp
(“There is, in any event, no credible argument for extending [Court’s decisions in GTE Sylvania, Khan and Leegin] to labor-facing restraints imposed by franchisors upon franchisees.
Franchisors do not hire out workers to franchisees. No propriety technology licensed by franchisors to franchisees is implicated in those relationships. Yet the Department of Justice chose
to file a brief in these pending cases effectively supporting franchisors’ position and suggesting that no-poach agreements limiting mobility among some of the lowest-wage, more vulnerable workers have legally cognizable benefits.”).
116. 551 U.S. at 893.
117. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1980); Nat.’l
Soc. Prof. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (agreements that are “plainly anticompetitive” and lack any
redeeming competitive virtue are conclusively presumed illegal without further examination).
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level).118 It is difficult to imagine justifications or evidence of pro-competitive benefits from those restrictive policies in either the horizontal or
the vertical context.119 But relegating them to a rule of reason analysis
merely because the franchisor is in a vertical relationship to the impact
of the wage fixing ignores the fact that the arrangements are plainly anticompetitive in most settings. The next section of this article describes
how receptive courts have been to the Department’s arguments concerning characterization and treatment of restrictions on worker wages and
mobility.
D. The Courts’ Evaluation of the Government’s Position on No-Poach
Agreement Litigation
Since the joint DOJ/FTC Guidance for Human Resources Professionals and, prior to that, the settlements in the Silicon Valley no-poach
cases, there have been several cases brought for imposition of no-poach
or no-hire agreements. In the main, these are class action lawsuits
brought against employers for their use of no-poach, non-solicitation,
and no-hire restraints. The cases have spanned several industries (fast
food franchises120, railroad equipment121, tenure-track faculty positions
at two prestigious universities’ medical schools122) and several of these
cases have involved the Department’s use of their Statements of Interest
to influence the judge on its resolution of key antitrust analysis.123 An
important policy question asks how has the Department fared in advocating for greater antitrust scrutiny of employment related practices and
what does the judicial treatment of the Department’s arguments suggest
about future judicial treatment of these restriction on worker compensation and mobility.
The courts considering these antitrust issues have typically deferred
to many of the Department’s views on these difficult antirust matters.
Such deference is appropriate because the Antitrust Division has some
of the nation’s best antitrust lawyers. However, the courts have, in some
instances, declined to follow all of the key arguments and recommendations that the government has advocated in its Statements and, instead,
118. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731; Jimmy
John’s, 2019 WL 2754864; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484.
119. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (rejecting the defendants’ argument
that no-hire agreements among franchises promote inter- or intra-brand competition).
120. See, e.g., id.; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731; Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864; Papa
John’s, 2019 WL 5386484.
121. See Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 464.
122. See Seaman, 2018 WL 671239.
123. See, e.g., Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 485; Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at
*2-3; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *5.
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have referred to case law precedents in their circuit.124 This section
briefly describes some of these recent holdings. In nearly all of these
reported decisions, it is important to note that most have been issued on
motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) and do not involve decisions
on the merits.125
First, some of the federal district courts considering the legality of
no-poach agreements have rejected the recommendations in the Statements because the Department is considered merely persuasive authority
on the subject of antitrust law. For example, in Conrad v. Jimmy John’s
Franchise, LLC, the district court, in considering whether no hire restrictions are ancillary restraints and therefore subject to the rule of reason, stated “[b]ut the Department is not the ultimate authority on the subject, especially in a situation like this one: after the Department
submitted its Statement of Interest, the American Antitrust Institute—
another titan in the antitrust arena—penned a letter in staunch opposition
to the DOJ.”126 Other courts have rejected the Department recommendation that no-poach cases should not be evaluated under the “quicklook” approach. For example, in Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC,
the court, considering a motion to dismiss, rejected the defendant’s argument that the quick-look analysis was inappropriate for use in cases
involving no-poach agreements because many such agreements must be
analyzed under the rule of reason.127 The court stated:
[e]ven a person with a rudimentary understanding of economics
would understand that if competitors agree not to hire each other’s
employee, wages for employees will stagnate. Plaintiff herself experienced the stagnation of her wages. A supervisor for a competing
McDonald’s restaurant told plaintiff she would like to hire plaintiff
for a position that would be similar to plaintiff’s position but would
pay $1.75-2.75 more per hour than she was earning. Unfortunately
for plaintiff, the no-hire agreement prevented the [competing
McDonald’s restaurant] from offering plaintiff the job. When plaintiff asked her current employer to release her, plaintiff was told she

124. See Leah Nylen & Joshua Sisco, DOJ Weighs in on More Antitrust Cases with Mixed
Success, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2019), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insightscenter/editors- /antitrust/north-america/doj-weighs-in-on-more-antitrust-cases-with-mixedsuccess; see, e.g., Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at *2-3 (comparing the DOJ’s and American Antitrust Institute’s positions on horizontal restraints in the franchise context); Papa
John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *5 (taking judicial notice of the DOJ’s Statement of Interest but
explaining that the court “will not . . . abdicate its duty to apply the law to the facts of this
case by blindly deferring to the DOJ’s analysis of distinct factual scenarios.”).
125. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *3-4; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731, at
*2; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *2; Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 477-78; Seaman,
2018 WL 671239.
126. 2019 WL 2754864 (refusing to grant franchisor’s motion to dismiss).
127. McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7.

2020]

NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

607

was too valuable. The Court agrees that an employee working for a
below-market wage would be extremely valuable to her employer.128

The courts considering no-poach agreements in franchise arrangements have not unanimously embraced the ancillary restraint doctrine as
recommended by the Department. Some courts have reasoned that once
discovery has been completed and the case is ready for trial, that would
be the more appropriate time to evaluate the viability and applicability
of an ancillary restraint allegation.129 Yet, in other cases, like Aya
Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., the court, at the stage
of considering motions to dismiss, stated that the plaintiffs had alleged a
horizontal market allocation agreement and, therefore, without any evidence of a reasonable and ancillary purpose for the subcontractors agreements, the no poach agreements would be evaluated under the per se
rule.130
The lower court decisions have taken varying positions on the role
of market power and market definition in these Section 1 cases. As a
general proposition, in a rule of reason case under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff has the burden of showing anticompetitive conduct
in a properly defined market or, rather than engaging in economic linedrawing in an effort to define the market, plaintiffs can show that the
restraint had actual harm to competition, such as reduced output or
higher prices.
In evaluating the competitive impact of no-poach agreements, recent decisions of lower courts have considered the area of the market
harmed by no poach agreements. While some courts have looked to the
product or brand sold by market participants, most courts have acknowledged that those cases involve competitive effects on the labor market.131
But some courts have expressed concern about evidence of limitations
on intra-brand competition between franchisees of the same product or
services brand.132 This is an important distinction: the courts that have
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., id. at *8 (“Though this Court has concluded that plaintiff has stated a claim
for a restraint that might be unlawful under the quick-look analysis, the evidence at a later
stage may not support it.”); Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at *3 (denying Jimmy John’s
motion to dismiss a case alleging horizontal restraints of trade in the franchise context where
“the method of antitrust analysis that should apply . . . will ultimately come down to the facts
behind these no-poach agreements, the relative independence of Jimmy John’s franchisees,
and more.”).
130. Aya Healthcare, 2018 WL 3032552, at *12. See also United States v. eBay, 968 F.
Supp. 2d 1030, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
131. See e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill.
2018) (“Although the franchisees are dealing in the same brand, they are still competitors, and
anyone with a rudimentary understanding of economics would understand that the no-hire
agreements have an anticompetitive effect on the labor market targeted by those firms.”).
132. See Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 393 F.Supp.3d 622, 637 (E.D. Mich.
2019) (citing Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1033 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d sub. nom.
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concluded that the antitrust focus should be on the competition for employees, rather than competition between products, arrived at the proper
legal conclusion.133
The Department’s Statements of Interest have had a positive impact
on judicial decision-making in this relatively new and clearly evolving
area of law. In particular, the Statements have assisted courts in gaining
a clear focus on the key issues of characterizing no-poach and similar
restraints on competition in the market for workers, on the applicability
of the ancillary restraint doctrine in cases involving franchisor-imposed
restraints on worker mobility, and on the utility of the “quick-look” analysis to these restrictive practices. They have provided useful insights
into technical areas of antitrust analysis and policy involving buyers’
markets. However, these Statements have not yet fully defined the
broader context of when restrictive practices are permissible in the area
of worker mobility and wage suppression. No-poach and no-hire agreements are two forms of restraints on competition in labor markets, along
with covenants not to compete and non-solicitation agreements; and they
share the common element that they restrict worker mobility but are
sometimes accompanied by beneficial attributes. The next section puts
those clearly restrictive practices, which are subject to the reach of the
antitrust laws, into the broader context of all forms of restraints on workers and on competition for labor.
IV. ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR MARKET RESTRICTIONS
The government’s heightened interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws in markets for labor is a positive development for antitrust
enforcement and the promotion of antitrust norms in the market for labor
and workers, which has been neglected by antitrust.134 It is also a positive development for protections of worker mobility, wage growth, and
employees’ career growth. It is estimated that approximately 18% of
William v. I.B. Fischer Nevada 999 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Under the rule of reason, an
inquiry must be made as to whether the purpose and effect of the hiring agreement were anticompetitive. The purpose the agreement is to prevent the franchises from hiring away each
other’s management employees. This agreement does not bar competitors of [other brand fast
food restaurants] from hiring away these managerial employees. It only prohibits movement
between the various franchises and since they are not competitive with each other, the agreement cannot be anti-competitive.”)).
133. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (“This case, though, is not about
competition for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees,
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and the McOpCos within a
locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”).
134. See generally Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for
Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018) [hereinafter Antitrust Remedies];
Marinescu & Posner, supra note 34; Paul, supra note 115, at 65; Stutz, Evolving Antitrust,
supra note 104.
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employees in the U.S. workforce are currently subject to restraints on
their mobility, wages and job growth prospects.135 Although antitrust
law and policy have frequently been implicated in cases involving restraints on employees or on employment,136 this has not been an easy fit
from an antitrust perspective. There are several reasons for this uneasy
fit: First, markets for labor are commonly thought of as monopsony markets because the buyer—employer—has considerably greater power
than the sellers—workers.137 Antitrust has considerable experience with
monopoly markets and the problems of monopoly—e.g., restricted output, higher prices charged to consumers, economic inefficiency, and social loss—but less experience in monopsony markets.138 However, it has
become increasingly evident that vigorous antitrust enforcement in monopsony labor markets is necessary to address the problems of suppressed job opportunities, suppressed worker salaries, and collateral
market effects of widespread use of restraints on labor.139
Second, in recent years there has been much greater interest in the
true economic and social effects of the many forms of constraints on
worker mobility and salary opportunities. The focus on the monopsony
effects in markets for labor is a much more recently studied aspect of
labor economics and antitrust policy. The conclusions are that the high
percentage of U.S. workers who are subject to agreements and covenants
restricting their employment opportunities are contributing to slow wage
growth and rising inequality.140 For example, recent studies have

135. See Labor Market Monopsony: Trends, Consequences and Policy Responses,
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF 8 (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [hereinafter White House Council]; Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Nomcompetes in the
U.S. Labor Force, U. MICH. L. & ECON. RES. 2-3, 12 (2019) (finding that 18.1% of current
workers work under a non-compete restraint and that 38.1% of workers has worked under a
non-compete provision at some time in their work history.).
136. See Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 6-9.
137. White House Council, supra note 135, at 2-5.
138. See Suresh Naidu & Eric Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law 2-4
(Jan. 13, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365374 [hereinafter
Labor Monopsony] (Monopsony in labor markets is caused by the high concentration in those
markets, the high costs of employees switching careers or jobs, and job differentiation, meaning that “employers with monopsony power, whatever its source, can suppress wages (and
degrade working conditions) in order to save labor costs.”); Marinescu & Posner, supra note
34, at 6.
139. Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 596 (“If a labor market monopsonist uses
noncompetes, it can deter other firms from entering the labor market and offering superior
wages and working conditions to workers…This calls for antitrust analysis rather than common law analysis.”).
140. See Labor Monopsony, supra note 138, at 2-3.
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demonstrated that worker wages are 4%-5% higher in states that do not
recognize or enforce worker non-compete restraints.141
Most states permit employers to impose non-compete agreements
that are intended to constrain job opportunities for employees but, as the
courts in states that enforce such restrictions have found, the employer
receives more substantial benefits from the imposition of the restraints
compared to the employees.142 However, in recent years, two significant
things have changed: First, state legislatures have begun to more carefully examine those restraints and are putting more stringent limits on
the scope and enforceability of these covenants.143 For example, recent
legislation in some states have prohibited the use of non-compete agreements to minimum wage employees who have limited job opportunities
and changing jobs is often the only way to improve those workers’ wages
and salary.144 Second, the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance states that anticompetitive behavior can be inferred from the circumstances even without an explicit agreement among conspirators.145 An industry practice
of imposing restrictive post-employment covenants and provisions may
be evidence of an anticompetitive purpose or used to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect in antitrust litigation concerning restraints of trade
or monopolization in employment markets.146 Robust competition in
markets for labor, the very thing that many no-poach and non-compete
agreements are intended to constrain, increases the likelihood that
worker wages do not stagnate and that there are real opportunities for
workers to improve their living conditions and work opportunities.147

141. Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not
to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 783, 799 (2019); Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al.,
Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech
Workers 4 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. of Econ. Studies, Paper No. CES-WP-17-09, 2018).
142. See Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 10-19 (evaluating arguments favoring enforcement of covenants restricting competition and those that are costs to employees,
other employers and other third parties incurred due to use of such restrictive practice). The
author concludes that “the new evidence, along with the new research about labor market
concentration, the evidence of wage stagnation, and the legacy of failed antitrust enforcement—all of this suggests that the courts have failed to give noncompetes sufficient scrutiny.”
Id. at 27.
143. Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 2.
144. See id. at 8-9.
145. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 4-5.
146. Jeffrey S. Boxer & Alexander G. Malyshev, The Dangers of Using Illegitimate
Means to Protect a Legitimate Interest: When Restrictive Covenants and Antitrust Laws Collide, CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP (May 2, 2019), https://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=5653.
147. See Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 20-21; see also Naidu, Posner &
Weyl, supra note 134, at 560-69; Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor
Market Concentration (Dec. 10, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3088767.
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Third, yet another explanation for lagging antitrust and other economic protections for workers is that unions, which were aggressive in
affording protections to workers’ salaries and job opportunities, have
been declining greatly in the last few decades.148 The unions were considered to be an important answer to systematic protection of worker interests in dealings with employers on wages, benefits and workplace
conditions.149 Today, a great deal of the U.S. workforce is not represented by collective bargaining groups or agreements and some pro-labor groups are advocating for greater antitrust protections, including enforcement by the government, for workers.150
Fourth, misguided interpretations of the “consumer welfare” standard in antitrust law and policy have dissuaded more rigorous enforcement of antitrust laws in labor markets. Basically, this standard provides
a goal for antitrust law under the Sherman Act and it is one that protects
the beneficial effects of competition which are enjoyed by ultimate consumers, intermediate purchasers and suppliers, and others.151 The argument that national competition policy represented by the antitrust laws
is advanced by powerful buyers (i.e., employers) suppressing the cost of
labor in order to lower prices to consumers is bereft of intellectual coherence and fidelity to the true goals of U.S. antitrust law because monopsony power in labor markets is often the result of high concentration
in those markets and this increases the opportunities for uncompetitive
practices.152
Finally, the fit between current antitrust law and labor policy favoring worker mobility and wage competitiveness is also complicated because of antitrust analytic requirements which present problems in litigating such cases. For example, one major problem in Section 1,
Sherman Act labor market cases is defining relevant markets and measuring the effects of restraints on workers as may be required in a rule of
reason analysis. There are several reasons for this challenge. Geographic
markets for workers tend to be highly local as most workers cannot
148. See Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 542-43.
149. See Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 542 (“Labor law protected workers who
sought to form unions to combat the market power of employers. The theory was that if workers banded together, they could use legally mandated collective bargaining and the threat of
strikes to prevent employers from paying them monopsony wages.”).
150. See Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 6-7, 12-13 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf.
151. Stutz, Evolving Antitrust, supra note 104, at 4-5. See also Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2254-56 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert
H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 197-201 (2008).
152. See Stutz, Evolving Antitrust, supra note 104, at 4-5.
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realistically move freely to follow jobs, especially with low wage jobs
such as fast food preparation and service. Because many types of employment are catalogued by complex job descriptions and classifications, determining which workers are in the relevant market and which
are not is difficult especially in cases brought as class actions.153 An
added complexity is the recent decision in Ohio v. American Express Co.
in which the Court held that plaintiffs who allege restraint in a vertical
agreement must define the relevant market in which competition is allegedly restrained as an element of their case.154 While the reach and
exact meaning of the Court’s language in that footnote is not clear, it
does seem likely that plaintiffs (including the government) in no-poach
(and similar worker restraint conspiracy) cases may be required to more
clearly delineate the market(s) where the restraints harmed competition
for workers. This will present a complication for efforts to prosecute restraints on worker markets.
It is equally important to note, as discussed in earlier parts of this
article, that antitrust law has been successfully applied to a variety of
restraints in markets for labor. So, notwithstanding the foregoing complexities and difficulties, the antitrust laws remain an important instrument in government and private party efforts to foster competition for
workers and their wages and job mobility in those markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Strong antitrust enforcement in labor markets fosters the growth of
competition for workers and thus increases workers’ access to new jobs,
higher paying jobs, and more career opportunities. The Silicon Valley
no-poach cases were a major catalyst to the Justice Department’s current
emphasis on promoting antitrust enforcement and protections in labor
markets by putting a spotlight on patently anticompetitive conduct by
major tech company CEOs. In response, the nation has seen a major
commitment by the Justice Department Antitrust Division’s to more vigorously enforce the Sherman Act in labor markets. The enforcement to
date has been insufficient, however. “Fit” problems remain due to the
sparse record of antitrust enforcement in labor-facing and monopsony
markets. In addition, the government’s enforcement initiatives face
153. For example, in Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 474-75, the court correctly concluded
that the no-poach agreement restraints occurred in the market for lateral hires (experienced
and trained employees) and described how recruiting, training and retaining such employees
would normally result in higher wages as the group of employers competed for the pool of
employees services. The court also noted that this competition had the effect of raising wages
in collateral or related categories of workers and therefore wages increased across many categories of workers in those competing firms. The companies’ responses include no poach
agreements.
154. 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
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challenges because of certain analytic requirements of the rule of reason
analysis and because of some uncertainty about the applicability of the
ancillary restraint doctrine to cases of restraints on worker competition.
Courts should steer away from application of the rule of reason in cases
involving no-poach and similar highly restrictive covenants or agreements because such analysis produces greater uncertainty for resulting
litigation.155 In contrast, the clarity enabled by judicial application of the
per se and quick-look forms of analysis in Section 1, Sherman Act cases
can prevent the most egregious forms of cartel wage suppression such as
no-poach and no-hire agreements by providing clear guidance to corporations.
The stakes are high in employment and labor markets and the Justice Department rightly focuses its attention on ensuring that those markets are competitive, worker wages do not stagnate, and employers act
fairly within the rules of competition law. While federal antitrust enforcement agencies and courts must refine antitrust analysis to meaningfully regulate anticompetitive conduct in labor markets, states also have
a role to play. States must re-examine and improve their laws and policies concerning other forms of restrictive practices such as covenants not
to compete and non-solicitation agreements. If the states and antitrust
enforcement agencies cannot effectively police employer policies to restrict competition by and between employees, then Congress must enact
national legislation to protect workers by ensuring fair competition in
labor markets.

155. The Court’s recent decision in Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2284-2286 n.7,
suggests that trying a case involving a restraint on worker wages or mobility that is classified
as a rule of reason case will become more difficult to plead and prove. Rule of reason cases
are difficult to succeed in because of the uncertainty of pleading and proof requirements as
well as the considerable expense of trying a case involving proof of defendants’ market power.
Professor Michael Carrier examined outcomes in rule of reason cases and concluded that defendants won 221 out of 222 rule of reason cases that reached final judgment from 1999-2009.
Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 829-30 (2009). This seeming propensity for the government and some
courts to avoid the “quick-look” and per se illegal analysis to no-poach, no-hire and similar
restrictive practices in labor markets portends inadequate enforcement of the antitrust laws to
those types of restrictive conduct.

